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Basic Rules

The initial read of Respondent's appeal brief left little doubt that
a review of a number of basic ground rules in a Rille 56, LR.C.P., proceeding
was needed, especially when a jury trial is requested. To wit:

Summary judgment under Idaho Rille of Civil Procedure 56(c)
is appropriate if the evidence before the court discloses no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Respondent's Brief failed to discuss how its Complaint's Count One
brought under L C. Section 55-901, et. seq. met this burden in light
ofLC. Section 55-908's clear and unambiguous language requiring factual
proof of actual fraudulent intent.

When a motion for summary judgment is made in a case that woilld
otherwise be tried to a jury, the court must draw all reasonable inferences
supported by the evidence in favor of the party resisting the motion. See,

Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 137 Idaho 844, 846,55 P.3d 298,300 (2002);
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851, 854

(1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154,
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156 (CtApp.1994); Burgess Farms v. New Hampshire Ins. Group, 108 Idaho
831,835,702 P.2d 869,873 (Ct.App.1985).

Summary judgment is impermissible when there is a conflict in the
evidence respecting material issues of fact. See, Wait v. Leavell Cattle Inc.,
136 Idaho 792,798,41 P.3d 220,226 (2001); First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A.
v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 792, 964 P.2d 654,659 (1998); Hines v. Hines, 129
Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997); Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp.,
94 Idaho 917,918-19,500 P.2d 218,219-20 (1972). Respondent's Brief failed
to discuss or resolve the conflicts between the Complaint's Count One

(I.C. Section 55-913(2)'S listedfactors and the Respondent's custom indices of
fraud) with I.C. Section 55-908's determination of actual fraudulent intent when
the sole answering defendant requested a jury trial.

When a jury trial has been requested, even if no direct conflict in the
evidence exists, a summary judgment motion must be denied if the evidence

is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn there from, and if
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. See, Olsen v.
JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,720,791 P.2d 1285,1299 (1990). Once again,
Respondent's Brief fundamentally failed to explain how under I.C. Section
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55-901, et. seq. its Complaint's Count One negated this basic principle for this

answering Defendant who requested a jury trial. See specifically, I.C. Section
55-908.

In light of Respondent's explanations and arguments, or the lack

thereof, the issues on appeal can now be refined to reflect the settled facts and
the applicable law.

1) Under I.C. Section 55-908, on the Complaint's Count One (the
fraudulent transfer claim), the District Court erred by

granting summary judgment against the sole answering defendant
based, wholly or in part, upon the default of the corporate
co-defendant.
In its Brief beginning at Page 19, Respondent attempts to recast the

Complaint's Count One as something other than a sole claim under I.C. Section
55-901, et. seq. by advancing the competing fictions of "real loaned funds" and

the newly invented "alternative claim for fraudulent transfer" theory. What utter
nonsense in light of the structure and language used by Plaintiffs counsel in the
Complaint!

First, Respondent argues that only Sterling Mortgage had "standing"
to defend the mortgage and its lien rights. Ordinarily, this might have been a
good argument, but in this case it is directly contrary to the factual evidence
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attached to the Complaint itself. On Page 2, first paragraph, of the February 28,
2008

Real Estate Mortgage between this Appellant and Sterling Mortgage, the

following unambiguous language is found:
"Mortgagor represents to and covenants with Mortgagee and Mortgagee's
successors, administrators and assigns, that Mortgagor will WARRANT and
defend said real estate and premises against the lawful claims of all persons."

See, Record, Page 29.
Contrary to Respondent's way of thinking, it is clear from the terms of the
governing mortgage document that either party to the Real Estate Mortgage
had the right, if not the obligation, to defend the transaction and Lot 74.

In addition to arguing against the evidence attached to one's own
complaint, Respondent also dropped the ball by failing to address the relevant
conflict oflaw principles with regard to the validity of the Promissory Note and
Real Estate Mortgage. Clearly, both documents contained a choice oflaw
provision calling for the application of Montana law. See, Record Pages 30 and
106.

Equally clear is the rather logical argument that if the Promissory Note is

valid under Montana law (and it is), then "real loaned funds" must have been
involved in the transaction. Surely, not even the Respondent would believe that a
construction project can be accomplished without real or actual payments to
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contractors and subcontractors alike. The construction monies had to come from
somewhere. And yes, they had to be "real funds."

Respondent continued to expand on its fictional argument by
unreasonably narrowing the holding in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872),
with a newly invented notion of "independent theories of liability." See,
Respondent's Brief, Page 21,jirst line. Considering the structure and language

used in the Respondent's Complaint, especially in the Prayer for Relief,
Respondent's logic and argument is utter nonsense. As presented on Page 14
of my opening brief, federal courts have extended the rule in Frow to apply to
defendants who are similarly situated, even if not jointly and severally liable.
See, Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F. 2nd 1499,1512
(11th Gir. 1984). With regard to this case, these holdings are clearly implemented

and embodied by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.

From an advocate's viewpoint, Respondent would have been far better
served by reconciling the inconsistencies between the structure and language of
its Complaint with the burden and form of proof required under I.C. Section
55-901, et. seq. This is especially true with regard to I.C. Section 55-908 and an

answering defendant's (mortgagor's) jury demand. Respondent's argument
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imputing Sterling Mortgage's default to this answering Defendant based upon a
newly hatched "real loaned funds" theory is illogical and diametrically opposed
to not only the Frow rationale, but Rule 56, I.R.C.P., as well. After all, how
under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., and I.C. Section 55-908 was summary judgment properly
granted as a matter of law when the specific controlling statute clearly and
unambiguously provides that actual fraudulent intent is a question of fact?
If Respondent intended to use a Rule 56 summary judgment proceeding in the

course of this case, its Complaint should have been structured and prosecuted in
a far different manner. In light of Respondent's case management choices, the
District Court's arguably implausible September 29, 2011 one minute fifty second
(00:01:50) decision making process orally granting summary judgment was

clearly and plainly an abuse of discretion and clear err. See, Record, Page 301,
and Pages 238-239, 243-249.

2) Under Rule 54, I.R.C.P., the District Court erred by

awarding Plaintiffs counsel its unpaid, unearned or incurred
attorney fees and costs.
Respondent's argument regarding unpaid or incurred attorney fees is a
bit confusing. Beginning on the bottom of Page 22 of its Brief, Respondent
argues:
"The other type of awardable costs, discretionary costs, is not subject to
the "actually paid" requirement; discretionary costs only have to be
"reasonably incurred." Attorney fees clearly are not costs as a matter of
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right and therefore are not subject to the "actually paid" requirement in
that rule. Attorney fees are only related to costs for purposes of making a
joint request for fees and cost: ... "
On the one hand, Respondent's argument appears to agree with Appellant
that attorney fees are "deemed costs" under Rule S4(e)(s) and therefore subject
to Rule S4(d). On the other hand, Respondent's argument attempts to divorce
attorney fees from the concept of "deemed costs" using a "joint request" theory.
A strange idea, especially when considered in light of Rule 16(a), LA.R.

As I argued in my Opening Brief, Rule S4(e)(s), LR.C.P., provides that

"attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as
costs in an action .... "

See, RECD Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-R

Engineers, Inc . ... , __ Idaho __ , 233 P.3d 1216 (2010). See, specifically,
Footnote 1 on Page 6 of the Opinion. Based upon the plain wording and a fair
reading of Rule S4(e)(s), attorney fees are indeed costs in an action. The
only issue seems to be whether they are subject to Rule S4(d)(1)(C) or
Rule 54(d)(1)(D), costs as a matter of right or discretionary costs. Costs as a
matter of right have to be "actually paid," or practically speaking, have to be paid
under a binding obligation, in order to be properly awarded. Discretionary costs,
on the other hand, are subject to a reasonably "incurred" test.
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With all due respect, Respondent's conclusion that attorney fees
are not "costs as a matter of right" was a bit hasty and not very well reasoned.
Realistically, when a district court makes the decision to award attorney fees
under I.C. Section 12-121, the award for all intent and purposes becomes a
certainty, and arguably a "matter of right." The only true discretionary element
is the amount.

For the sake of a shortened reply argument, let's assume that the
Respondent is correct and that only Rule 54(d)(1)(D),s "reasonably incurred"
requirement has to be met. In this case, trouble still abounds.

Merriam-Webster defines the word "incur" as a transitive verb as:
to become liable or subject to. In a business or accounting sense, the word
"incurred" is commonly defined as:
A word used by accountants to communicate that an expense has
occurred and needs to be recognized on the income statement even
though no payment was made. The second part of the necessary entry
will be a credit to a liability account.

The problems in this case date back to my early Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P.,
Motion to discover, or flesh out, the real party in interest. See, Record,
Pages 137-145. To date, Respondent's counsel has not produced any ofthe

named Plaintiffs board of directors' minutes authorizing this lawsuit.
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Nor has Respondent supplied the court with a client letter of engagement
demonstrating any Board authorization, or outlining the scope and terms of the
representation in this lawsuit. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(D), a named party simply
can not "incur" an expense if that party is not liable to pay that expense.
Perhaps this is the principal reason why the Island Woods Homeowners
Association has for the past few years not stated or recognized the true or correct
amount of Respondent's attorney fees in the annual financial statements to its
members. IWHA's lack of proper reporting for accounting purposes is certainly
consistent with Respondent counsel's representation to the District Court to the
effect that: "Counsel for Plaintiff has yet to be paid for any of the work that it has
performed over the last few years, ... " See, Appellant's Opening Brief, Page 23.

Realistically, in a normal attorney-client relationship, the client is not
given "years" to pay its attorney for representation based upon hourly billings.
Yet, on Page 23 of its Brief, Respondent counsel represents to this Court,
without citation to any part of the record, that:
"IWHA could never have afforded legal representation in this
matter if the rules required IWHA to pay its $100,000 legal bill
prior to seeking reimbursement from McGimpsey."
To this off-the-record, unsupported statement, I reply -- balderdash!
According to the official Board minutes released to the resident members on a
periodic basis, IWHA's cash flow was/is good and the Association has an ample
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cash reserve account. Respondent's counsel's unsupported remarks should be
stricken or disregarded.

The true nature of this case is now blindingly obvious. The initial litigation
over the alleged failure to landscape or install a mailbox was so feeble that the
only goal of any of this was the generation of attorney fees for the Plaintiffs
lawyers. However, without a proper Island Woods Board authorization, the
present suit is nothing more than a law firm litigating pro set for its fees. To this
end, this Court and the Court of Appeals have left little doubt that pro se litigants,
including attorneys litigating pro se, are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
See, Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App.

1989). See also, Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 397, 146 P·3d 657,
663 (2006); Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148
(1999).

Before I leave the riveting subject of attorney fees, I am compelled to
respond to Respondent's Footnote 2 on Page 22 of its Brief. Yes, I am indeed
challenging the reasonableness of the unearned fees awarded under the
March 30, 2012 fee and cost request. That is precisely why Pages 24-25 were
included in my Opening Brief. Frankly, I am unaware of any rule of
jurisprudence or case law that stands for the proposition that "unearned" fees
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can be legally, or for that matter ethically, paid. The equation that I invoked
earlier bears repeating: No law cited + no arguments made + no
authority provided = NO WORK = NO PAY!

3) The District Court erred under I.C. Section 11-102 by
allowing the sheriffs sale to go forward based upon a
demonstrated mathematically and financially defective
writ of execution.
On Page 24 of its Brief, Respondent begins by informing this Court that
with regard to its defective Amended Writ of Execution:
"The District Court rejected this argument without much discussion."
Correctly speaking, the District Court, in a well worn and repetitive pattern of
oral decision making, rejected my argument without any discussion -- period.

Respondent then goes on to make the following clearly misleading
statements:
"First, McGimpsey has utterly failed to show what mathematical
errors are contained in the Amended Writ. McGimpsey made the
mathematical errors."
Respondent's statements are not only misleading, they are also
disingenuous. On Page 26, last paragraph, of my Opening Brief, I plainly
and clearly wrote the following:
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"On February 13, 2012, I filed a motion under Rule 62, LR.C.P. asking the
District Court to quash the Amended Writ and Levy against Lot 74 based
upon demonstrated mathematical and financial defects. Record, Pages 349-351.
A brief in support of the Rule 62 Motion was filed on February 27, 2012, prior to
hearing. Record, Pages 364-371. Attached to the brief as Exhibit A
(Record, Page 371) was an Excel spreadsheet that clearly
demonstrated to the District Court the mathematical and financial
errors in the Amended Writ." Emphasis supplied.
If I correctly understood the balance of Respondent's argument

defending its mathematically defective Amended Writ, there appears to be little,
if any, concern, desire or need to comply with the "actually due" language of
LC. Section 11-102. And, to my ever growing surprise, at least according to
Respondent's argument, an unwritten statutory exception for "minor
mathematical errors" in a writ of execution, now exists. Subject, of course,
to a newly invented post-sale corrective proceeding.

Respondent's argument that a mathematically incorrect writ can be used
to effect a valid execution sale is appalling. What purpose then does LC. Section
11-102 serve

if a judgment creditor can quite unintelligently miscalculate the

amount of its judgments and proceed to an execution sale anyway? Unless the
words "actually due" mean something other than mathematically correct
amounts due onjudgment(s), the letter ofLC. Section 11-102 should be followed.
After all, what could be any easier than getting the math right? The District
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Court erred by not requiring the Amended Writ to be corrected prior to sale.
Especially, an Amended Writ that asked for more money than the original
judgments called for. In mathematical terms, we are back to a simple equation:
Bad Math = Statutorily Defective Writ & Levy = Invalid Sheriffs Sale.

4) Under Rule 56, LR.C.P., the District Court erred by
orally dismissing this answering Defendant's three
Counterclaims without requiring any proof or evidence
of the Plaintiffs affirmative defenses of issue and claims
preclusion.
In almost every case, an issue arises that lays bare both judicial defects
and the politics in play. For this case, Issue #4 was it. Issue #4 embodies the sad
reality that when a District Court is intent on a course of action - it will happen.
No matter what!

On Page 27 of its Brief, Respondent makes the following statements:
"McGimpsey instead cites inapplicable cases discussing how the initial
appellant brief must contain all issues on appeal. The standard, of course, is
different at the district court level where issues do not have to be resolved all
at once and failure to challenge the counterclaims during the initial motion for
summary judgment would not have prevented a subsequent challenge on
summary judgment."
Respondent's thinking is plainly at odds with this Court's analysis and
reasoning in Beatriz Nava, et. a1. v. Christian R. Rivas- Del Toro et. aI.,

_ _ Idaho ___ , 264 P.3d 960 (2011). In Nava, Justice Eismann wrote:
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"Typically, parties moving for summary judgment merely state the relief or order
sought in the motion, and then state with particularity the grounds for the motion in
a supporting memorandum. If a ground for summary judgment is not stated with
particularity in the moving papers, the opposing party need not address that ground.
"For purposes of summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of
proving the absence of material fact issues. Only then does the burden shift to the
non-moving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho
737,746,215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009) (citation omitted)."
It is readily apparent that Respondent clings to the mistaken belief that

its July 14, 2011 Clarification pleading, which by some drafting magic has now
become a "Clarification brief', fulfilled the requirement for pleading with
particularity. Well, here's a news flash. The Clarification pleading may be a lot of
things, but the one thing it is not is a legal brief. It contains no cogent argument
and no discernable cite to statute, authority or precedent. In reality, it is nothing
more than a "mention in passing" for the affirmative defenses of issue and claims
preclusion. See, Record, Pages 189-191.

As this Court held in Oregon Mutual Insurance Company v. Farm Bureau

Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 148 Idaho 47, 218 P.3 rd 391 (2009):
"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting
it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance
of the evidence."
See also, Ticor Title Co. v. Sanion, 144 Idaho 119,122, 157P.3rd 613,616 (2007)·
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How then was a proper dismissal of any of this Defendant's three
Counterclaims even remotely possible under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., given that the
Plaintiff offered absolutely no cogent argument or cites to statute, authority or
precedent in its: 1) initial Rule 56 Motion; 2) its supporting Amended
Memorandum; 3) its Clarification pleading; 4) its reply brief; or 5) at hearing?

The answer is quite simply that in order to pull off this bit of judicial
alchemy, the moving party needed help. And, in this case that help was omni
present in the form of a very activist jurist who was more than able and willing to
fill in the Plaintiffs drafting potholes. A very activist jurist who, I might add,
was also quite willing to reward Plaintiffs counsel with unearned attorney fees.

Plaintiffs counsel in the run up to summary judgment had every
opportunity to step back and correct their pleading and practice approach.
Especially after reading this Appellant's Brief in opposition. Instead, they elected
to roll the dice on a drive-by or mention-in-passing approach for their affirmative
defenses leaving it up to the District Court to fill in the gaps. Well, it worked.
So far, Plaintiff and its counsel have been able to prosecute this case via tweets
by merely introducing a general legal theory in cryptic form, and then letting the
District Court do the rest. Perhaps Respondent is correct that this Court's
I.A.R Rule 35(a)(6) standards don't apply to proceedings in a district court.
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But, rightly or wrongly, that is what this appeal is largely about. Moving on.

5) Under Rules 15, 54(c) and 56, LR.C.P., the District Court erred
by allowing the Plaintiff, sans motion or order, to add a claim
for a Fourth Judgment post-default to the Complaint's Count Two
-- the declaratory judgment action.
First, we have the law:
Rule 54(c), LR.C.P., Demand for judgment, states in applicable part
that:
"A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or
exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment."
Then, we have Respondent's excuse for not following the law:
"IWHA inadvertently forgot to include the Fourth Judgment in
the Complaint." Respondent's Brief, Page 28, last paragraph, first
sentence.
Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief, Record Page 25, clearly sought a declaratory
judgment for just three (3) judgments. Yet, post-default, the summary judgment
included four (4) judgments with the Fourth Judgment adding approximately
fifty percent (50%) to the Plaintiffs initial money demand. How was this
amazing judicial maneuver possible without resorting to a timely and proper
Rule 15, LR.C.P., amendment you ask? The answer here is the same as that
discussed above with regard to dismissal of the three Counterclaims. Friends
with black robes in high places are good to have. They can make arguments
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when you haven't. They can deem your opponent's arguments frivolous when
they aren't. They can also make summary judgment even more summary by
turning a blind eye to those pesky procedural rules like Rule 15 and Rule 17,
LR.C.P. In general, they can make life really, really easy. And, the best news -you get paid for doing nothing.

Okay, enough of the sour grapes. But, darn it, it's hard to watch such
blatant disregard for plainly written rules and statutes and not want to jump to
your feet and yell-- foul. Or, in legal parlance -- I object! When did
"inadvertence" become a substitute or excuse for proper jurisprudence?
I certainly can't fault Respondent's counsel for perfecting the art of the half
argument. Or, in some instances, the non-argument. Win by any means
seems to be in vogue these days.

To my way of thinking, the fault lies squarely with a District Court
who from day one expressed a complete and utter dislike for this case and was
more than willing to move it as fast as possible by any means off the docket.
On this issue, the District Court clearly erred by allowing the Plaintiff to add the
Fourth Judgment post-default without a proper Rule 15 amendment during the
summary judgment process. In short, the District Court's error poisoned the case
for all of the parties, defaulted or otherwise.
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6) Under Rule 56, LR.C.P., based upon the evidence and
exhibits, the District Court erred by constructively
reclassifying the ownership interests of the two individual
Defendants' homestead from tenant-in-common separate
property interests to a quasi community property interest.
Respondent advanced a two prong argument on this issue: standing and
Idaho's community property law. I am going to begin with the easier of the two
prongs: standing.

Distilled to its essence, Respondent argues that despite being a
tenant-in-common owner of Lot 74 that this answering Defendant is precluded
from raising a legal argument defending the ownership status of Lot 74 because
of my wife's default. Respondent's misunderstanding is a clear departure from
general real estate law and the structure and scope of its Complaint.

Respondent's counsel has for some strange reason failed to grasp, or even
recognize, the in rem nature of Lot 74, and the role that it plays in the defense of
each of the property owners' interests and the Property itself. Lot 74 is owned by
two people as undivided tenants-in-common. Is it all that difficult to understand
that both owners have an independent right to defend a claim against the
Property? And, is it all that difficult to understand that when one of those owners
exercises their individual right to defend, that despite the overlapping benefit to
the passive owner, the defending owner is in actuality representing his/her own
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interests? From an analytical perspective, this answering Defendant's defense of
Lot 74 in this multiple party case is nothing more than a fundamental application
of the Frow holding. In summary, there is no legitimate issue of standing to be
considered.

The crux of this issue is the dustup over the unsupported classification of
the ownership of Lot 74 as community property. And, of course, the classification
of the judgments against this answering Defendant as community debt despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

On Page 33 of its Brief, Respondent's position can be distilled to three
parts:
1) That it is irrelevant "that the McGimpseys were initially married in

a non-community property state or that they were residing in a
non-community property state when they purchased the Property";
2) That Lot 74's ownership classification is not determined by

the McGimpseys' decision to own the property as undivided
tenants-in-common; and
3) The ownership classification or status of real property under Idaho law
is determined by the source of the funds used to purchase the
property.
Respondent's attempt to change the reality of this situation reminds me of the old
saying that: "Even the most able of counsel can be defeated by the facts or the
law."
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First, let's start with the basics: The Complaint itself. Aside from the
single use of the words "community interest" in Paragraph 78 of the Complaint,
there is absolutely no mention of community property at issue. Record, Page 23.
There is no count, no claim, and certainly no mention of community anything
in the Complaint's Prayer for Relief. In fact, in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint's
Prayer for Relief, it was only the sale of the separate property interest of
Mr. McGimpsey that was requested. Record, Page 26. Procedurally, the sleight
of hand conversion of Lot 74 to a community asset didn't occur until after the
District Court's oral grant of summary judgment on September 29,

2011.

As discussed at length above, considering Rule 54(c)'s rather plain and
unambiguous constraints on post-default relief, the classification of Lot 74
as community property was a truly amazing piece of legal fiction.

Rule 54(c) notwithstanding, the Achilles heel of Respondent's logic lies in
the misplaced reliance on the "source of funds" rule to determine Lot 74's status.
Yes, it is indeed true that the McGimpseys were married in Montana, a common
law state, in 1993. It is equally true that they were full time residents of Montana
in January 2001 when Lot 74 was purchased. And, it is most certainly true that
by virtue of B.W., Inc.'s corporate warranty deed that they took title to Lot 74
as undivided tenants-in-common. See, Record, Page 214.
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So, how exactly do funds of residents residing in a common law state like
Montana magically become community funds in Idaho, thereby giving rise to a
community asset? In a common law state, even funds held in a joint account,
are considered to be held in separate property interests. Surely, those funds
don't lose their separate property character when they are used to purchase real
property in a community property state. Thus, contrary to Respondent's way
of thinking, it is indeed relevant that the McGimpseys were married in a
non-community property state, and that they were residing in a non-community
property state when they purchased Lot 74. In a common law state, like
Montana, community funds or community property simply don't exist.

Just saying the words -- community property or community debt -doesn't make it so. You can say or chant the word -- community -- a hundred
times, maybe even a thousand times, but that doesn't change the classification of
property or debt if the evidence is to the contrary. In this case, the District Court
was not presented with a single fact or piece of conflicting evidence that
supported Lot 74's ownership status as a community asset, or that Mr.
McGimpsey's judgments were community debts. The Respondent created these
fictions. And, the District Court, in its haste to clear the docket, bought in to
them. Legally and procedurally, it was clear error then, and it's clearly error now.
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In addition to properly classifying the ownership of property prior to
execution, a judgment creditor also has a duty to properly structure the sheriffs
sale. This then leads to the last two issues on appeal:

7) The District Court did indeed err by allowing the sheriffs
sale of Lot 74 to go forward without requiring the Plaintiff to
comply with the execution process governing homesteads set
forth in I.C. Section 55-1101, et. seq.

8) A valid execution sale can not be made against a homestead
owned by a husband Gudgment debtor) and wife (nonjudgment debtor) as undivided tenants-in-common without
a pre-sale appraisal and a determination of the tenants'
respective ownership interests?
Respondent's argument on these last two issues comes across as
begrudgingly gratuitous and to be frank, insulting. Considering that homesteads
are a special class of property with statutes specifically designed to give valuation
protection to homesteaders, it is hardly appropriate to refer to recently updated
Idaho statutes as "antiquated," and in the next breath dismiss their application as
one of mere discretion for a judgment creditor. Respondent's roll-of-the-dice
approach to Lot 74's homestead valuation demonstrates an unbelievable
misunderstanding of the law's purpose. Especially, in a situation where the
property is owned as undivided tenants-in-common where one owner is a
judgment debtor and the other not.
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On Page 38 of its Brief, Respondent clearly and without qualification
admits that the Property (Lot 74) was "sold for a reduced price" at the March 27,
2012 sheriffs sale, but then goes on to offer six speculative reasons for the

reduction. Seriously? This admission against interest falls into the same
category and importance as the admission that the named Plaintiff hasn't paid its
attorneys for years. To be fair, let's add one more cogent reason as to why Lot 74
was sold at a reduced price. A reason that was completely disregarded by the
District Court in the motions challenging the sales validity. That reason is:

(7) The Plaintiffs failure to set a proper minimum bid when

selling an undivided tenant-in-common owned property.
Monetarily, Reason #7 is the only one that has any direct correlation or
mathematical influence on the sales price. In a financial sense, Respondent's
other six reasons are just pure, unadulterated fluff incapable of being monetized.

Respondent argues that even if a pre-sale appraisal was mandated, the
failure to show prejudice bars relief. Normally, I would question the rationale
behind this line of reasoning as pure nonsense. But, in this case I am reminded
that this is the same Respondent that believes that it is okay to add relief to a
complaint post-default, add affirmative defenses post-filing to a summary
judgment proceeding, and proceed to a sheriffs sale on a mathematically
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defective writ. This is also the same Respondent that has three transparent
mistakes on its appeal Briefs cover page. How then, can there be any realistic
expectation that this same Respondent understood the simple algebra involved
in setting a proper minimum bid for a tenant-in-common owned homestead
where one tenant was a judgment debtor and the other not?

All told, for those who still believe that the written law serves a somewhat
useful purpose, isn't it rather silly to entertain any argument as to who has the
duty of appraisal for a homestead in light of Idaho Code Title 55, Chapters 10 and
11? Based upon the plain statutory language, it is abundantly clear that this duty
initially falls squarely on the judgment creditor.

And, as far as prejudice involving a sheriffs sales price is concerned,
Respondent has apparently forgotten that all of Lot 74's owners had an intangible
right to a fair sale in a public forum populated by willing independent buyers.

In practice, the forced sale of a tenant-in-common owned homestead
should be a relatively simple three part process: 1) Properly classify the
property's status; 2) Properly determine the respective parties ownership
interests; and 3) Properly structure and conduct the sale. Plaintiff-Respondent
failed on all three counts. Correspondingly, the District Court erred by its failure
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to supervise and rein in the Plaintiffs utter misunderstanding and disregard for
the law.

Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal

Turning now to the usual and expected topic of attorney fees and costs,
Respondent has requested such under I.C. Section 12-121 and I.A.R. 41(a) based
upon the notion that "none of the eight legal issues on appeal have any merit."
In addition, Respondent's counsel gratuitously included an ad hominem invective
on Page 40, Footnote 3 of its Brief in a not so subtle attempt to color the Court's
impression of this Appellant's past life.

Personally and professionally, I have always viewed an opponent's
ad hominem attacks as a sign of weakness. When a lawyer resorts to such tactics
in a legal brief you can bet with some certainty that it is an attempt to cover up
either pleading and practice mistakes, or play to political theatre. Regardless,
the dignity of the law is tainted and the process perverted.

The monotonous structure of Respondent's Brief coupled with a reliance
on I.C. Section 12-121 to request fees raises a somewhat interesting question:
When does the repetitive, incessant or unnecessary use of the word "frivolous"
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become frivolous conduct? Under I.C. Section 12-123(1)(b), Conduct is frivolous
if: 1) it serves merely to harass or maliciously injure a party; or 2) it is not
supported by fact or a good faith argument in law. Thus, it seems entirely
possible that a repetitive, incessant or unnecessary use of the word "frivolous"
can be frivolous conduct. The same could also be said for ad hominem attacks.

Considering the nature and severity of Plaintiffs procedural and
substantive missteps in the structure and conduct of this case, it is all but
statistically impossible that none of the eight legal issues raised on appeal would
have any merit. Quite the opposite. All eight issues, jointly and severally, raise
legitimate issues of fact and/or law. Thus, this Court's holdings in Turner v.

Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 812 P.2d 737 (1991) apply and would clearly be a bar to
any award of Respondent's requested attorney fees and costs.
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CONCLUSION

From the ashes of a feeble controversy involving a few trees, grass and
a lowly mailbox, rises the possibility that some truly good precedent will be born
in the state of Idaho from this case. Although the facts of this case may be

somewhat unique, the lessons to be learned can be universally applied.

By way of example, a claim for a fraudulent transfer brought under I.C.
Section 55-901, et. seq., coupled with this Defendant's jury demand, is an issue
of first impression in a Rule 56 summary judgment proceeding. Then, there is
the issue of first impression for unpaid, unearned or incurred attorney fees as
"deemed costs" under Rule 54. And the list goes on.

Each of the eight issues on appeal present either a fact or some piece of
law that is a unique take on the applicable statutes or procedural rules. The
Plaintiffs many mistakes, coupled with the District Court's willingness to bless
those mistakes, gives this Court more than enough raw clay to work with.

Although the list of issues is long and the mistakes many, the scales of
justice can be rebalanced by simply applying the law as written to the facts at
hand. There is no good or sufficient need to resort to fictions or nonessential
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mud slinging to correct the errors in this case file. Good legal work and a steady,
fair judicial hand should get the job done in short order.

DATED this _ _ _day of July, 2012.

Respectfully submitted,

.
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Philip P. cGimpsey
Appellant-Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that pursuant to LA.R. Rule 34(d), two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served
by United States mail, postage prepaid on this ~"--_
following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker, Esq.
Loren K. Messerly, Esq.
Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
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of July 2012, upon the

